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The Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change, adopted by 195 nations, was 
the culmination of a year of action 
by Pacific Island governments and 
communities. Global warming was 
the central issue of security and rights 
in 2015, and there were significant 
advances on regional oceans and 
 climate policy—a positive example of 
the collective advocacy dubbed the 
“New Pacific Diplomacy” (Fry and 
Tarte 2015).
Throughout the year, the Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat (pifs) intro-
duced the new Framework on Pacific 
Regionalism, establishing a process 
to prioritize regional public policy. 
Despite improved relations after the 
2014 elections in Fiji, Prime Minister 
Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama again 
refused to join the annual Forum lead-
ers meeting, held in Port Moresby in 
September. Papua New Guinea and 
Fiji continued to assert their leadership 
ambitions, while governments held 
summits with India, Japan, France, 
and Republic of Korea.
There was increasing debate over 
human rights across the region, on 
violence against women, the abuse of 
asylum seekers on Manus and Nauru, 
and the right to self-determination in 
non-self-governing territories. Public 
concern over West Papua prompted 
debate at the Forum leaders’ meet-
ing, while the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group expanded its reach to grant 
associate membership to Indonesia 
and observer status to a coalition of 
West Papuan independence groups.
Since her appointment at the 2014 
Pacific Islands Forum in Palau, Sec-
retary-General Dame Meg Taylor has 
bedded down a series of reforms in the 
Forum Secretariat in Suva. These inter-
nal changes come as part of a broader 
transformation of the regional archi-
tecture (Maclellan 2015d) through the 
Council of Regional Organizations of 
the Pacific (crop) and newer institu-
tions like the Fiji-based Pacific Islands 
Development Forum (pidf). 
Even as the regional intergovern-
mental organizations were debating 
their mandate and structure during 
2015, there were significant changes 
of leadership. As Pacific countries 
mobilized for the climate negotia-
tions in Paris, the director-general of 
the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Program (sprep), David 
Sheppard, announced his resignation. 
After six years at the helm, Sheppard 
was replaced by his former deputy, 
Kosi Latu of Sāmoa.
At the pidf, Feleti Teo resigned to 
take up the position as head of the 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission in March. Former Fiji 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Amena 
Yauvoli stood in as an interim execu-
tive before François Martel of Sāmoa 
was appointed in September as the 
full-time pidf secretary-general. 
Martel has worked for many years in 
resource management, biodiversity, 
conservation, and climate change.
Forum Fisheries Agency (ffa) 
Director-General James Movick 
 completed his first three-year term in 
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2015 and was endorsed by ffa mem-
bers to serve a second term to 2018.
In an unexpected move, the direc-
tor-general of the Melanesian Spear-
head Group (msg) secretariat in Port 
Vila, Peter Forau, resigned his post in 
November, two years before the end 
of his second term. Plans to establish 
“Melanesian Solutions” as the sec-
retariat’s commercial arm could not 
make up for funding shortfalls as the 
msg work program expanded during 
2015. Departing his post, Forau also 
reflected on divergences within the 
msg over democracy in Fiji and West 
Papua: “There have been some influ-
ences exerted on some of our members 
about how they should relate to Fiji 
during the time when the govern-
ment was not an elected government. 
And so some of those relationship 
issues are still around, and sometimes 
something has happened between, 
for example, Papua New Guinea and 
Fiji” (rnzi 2015). In early 2016, Fiji’s 
Amena Yauvoli was named as a candi-
date for the post.
At year’s end, Audrey Aumua was 
appointed as deputy director-general 
of the Secretariat of the Pacific Com-
munity (spc), taking over from Fekita 
‘Utoikamanu. As a former World 
Health Organization regional repre-
sentative, Dr Aumua will head the 
spc’s Suva operations, supporting 
Director-General Dr Colin Tukuitonga 
at the spc’s Nouméa headquarters.
At a crop meeting in Nouméa 
in February, agency chiefs agreed 
to a review of regional governance 
and financing, to be led by former 
spc Director-General Jimmie Rod-
gers. The collaborative work of the 
crop agencies is currently managed 
through seven crop Working Groups 
on the following: Population and 
Health (chaired by spc); Human 
Resource Development (University of 
the South Pacific, or usp); Sustain-
able  Development (sprep and pifs); 
Marine Sector (spc and ffa); Informa-
tion and Communications Technology 
(usp); Lands (spc); and Gender (spc 
and pifs). 
The appointment of Dame Meg 
Taylor as the first female pifs 
secretary-general coincided with 
the replacement of the 2005 Pacific 
Plan by a new Framework on Pacific 
Regionalism. For Taylor, “regionalism 
had lost its politics under the Pacific 
Plan,” while the new Framework 
provides “a process for identifying 
the region’s public policy priorities” 
(Taylor 2015).
Described as “the master strategy 
for strengthening cooperation and 
integration between the states and 
territories of the Pacific region,” the 
Framework was tested throughout 
2015. The pifs hopes that the new 
Framework will help clear a cluttered 
Forum agenda, narrow the number of 
items placed before overwhelmed lead-
ers, delegate tasks to regional ministe-
rial meetings, and provide a mecha-
nism for non-state actors to engage in 
policy formulation.
In April, eight representatives from 
across the region were appointed 
to the Framework’s Specialist Sub-
Committee on Regionalism (sscr) 
to manage the process for identifying 
and prioritizing high-level regional 
public policy. Chaired by the Forum 
secretary-general, the members 
include regional representatives from 
Melanesia, Polynesia, Micronesia, and 
Australia/New Zealand, as well as 
sectoral representatives from Smaller 
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Island States (sis), civil society, and 
the private sector.
pifs called for submissions on 
regional initiatives in May; sixty-eight 
submissions were received and con-
sidered by the sscr in July. The sscr 
recommendations were then submitted 
to the annual Forum Officials Com-
mittee in August, before consideration 
by Forum leaders at their September 
retreat in Papua New Guinea.
The committee advanced five 
proposals on climate change, West 
Papua, information and communica-
tions technology, maximizing returns 
from fisheries, and action on cervical 
cancer. In Port Moresby, some of these 
issues were delegated to crop agen-
cies and ministers for further review, 
while others were addressed in official 
statements, such as the 2015 Pacific 
Islands Forum Leaders Declaration on 
Climate Change Action.
Compared to the Pacific Plan, 
which was dominated by technocrats 
with limited public input, the Frame-
work process has begun with signs 
of increased transparency. All sscr 
submissions were posted online (pifs 
2015d) and nongovernmental organi-
zations gained unprecedented access 
at the Civil Society Organisation 
Regional Forum, held before the Port 
Moresby leaders meeting. Despite this, 
leading women’s activist Claire Slatter 
has questioned whether the new policy 
is “old kava in a new tanoa,” stating: 
“For ngos, the jury is still out on the 
framework” (Slatter 2015).
At their June summit in Honiara, 
msg leaders also endorsed a series 
of reports and declarations cover-
ing trade, policing, sports, violence 
against women, emergency response 
coordination, and plans for a center 
of excellence on youth development. 
In a key decision, leaders endorsed 
the Implementation Framework for 
the msg 2038 Prosperity for All Plan, 
an overarching regional strategy that 
maps priorities for the next twenty-
five years.
For Papua New Guinea, 2015 
marked the fortieth anniversary of 
independence. Port Moresby hosted 
the fifteenth Pacific Games in July and 
the forty-sixth Pacific Islands Forum 
in September. These events were trial 
runs, as the PNG capital prepares to 
host the next msg summit in 2017 and 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (apec) summit in 2018—a major 
challenge for accommodation, trans-
port, security, and communications.
As Forum chair, PNG Prime Minis-
ter Peter O’Neill reaffirmed a com-
mitment of aid in the amount of 300 
million kina to other Island countries 
over five years, as a significant part 
of his country’s regional diplomacy 
(k1.00 is approximately us$.32). 
O’Neill has pledged k100 million to 
Solomon Islands, with a k20 million 
tranche presented to the Sogavare 
government at the msg summit in 
June. With Smaller Island States angry 
about the lack of support from the 
Forum Secretariat in Suva, Papua New 
Guinea has also pledged us$3.7 mil-
lion for the creation of an sis office.
O’Neill’s relationship with Fiji 
Prime Minister Bainimarama has 
remained tense, as the two countries 
joust over regional leadership. The 
Fiji prime minister attended the msg 
summit alongside O’Neill in June but 
snubbed the Forum leaders meeting in 
September.
Despite renewed engagement at the 
official and ministerial level, Bainima-
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rama suggested that Fiji would only 
fully rejoin the Forum if Australia and 
New Zealand were to leave the orga-
nization: “I will not participate in any 
Forum leaders meeting until the issue 
of the undue influence of Australia 
and New Zealand and our divergence 
of views is addressed” (Bainimarama 
2015a). Despite this, Bainimarama 
visited Australia in October to open 
the Australia-Fiji Business Forum. 
Australia’s minister for International 
Development and the Pacific, Steven 
Ciobo, visited Fiji three times during 
the year.
In late 2014, Fiji and Australia pro-
posed a regional gathering of leaders 
for February 2015, without consulting 
the Forum chair or secretary-general. 
The meeting was abandoned in embar-
rassed silence after a number of coun-
tries questioned the agenda. Instead, 
the inaugural Forum Foreign Affairs 
Ministers Meeting (ffamm) was held 
in Sydney in July 2015 to discuss 
coordination on disaster manage-
ment and relations with development 
partners. At the September Forum, 
leaders agreed that the ffamm will be 
an annual event and will be attended 
by representatives of Forum associ-
ate members French Polynesia, New 
Caledonia, and Tokelau.
By winnowing out the regional 
agenda through the Framework pro-
cess and the ffamm, leaders hope to 
reduce the number of topics discussed 
at their annual retreat. NZ Foreign 
Minister Murray McCully noted: 
“Forum Leaders have asked for the 
space to discuss priority strategic 
issues during their annual Forum 
meetings. A standing Forum Foreign 
Ministers meeting would give them 
this space by taking responsibility for 
the more detailed conversations” (pifs 
2015c).
Beyond its Island members, the 
Forum works with a diverse range 
of partners, from long-standing 
donors such as Japan, the European 
Union (EU), and the United States, to 
emerging players like China, India, 
and Indonesia. In a speech in May, 
pifs Secretary-General Taylor said: 
“There is unprecedented interest by a 
wide range of external actors in our 
region—some new, some old, and 
all combined to present a crowded 
and complex geopolitical landscape” 
 (Taylor 2015).
Taylor noted in her speech: “Pres-
ently, it is an uphill battle for the lead-
ers to articulate and put forward their 
own collective agenda at the regional 
level when there are so many actors 
and partners at the table.” During the 
year, the Forum reassessed the role 
of the seventeen Post-Forum Dia-
logue (pfd) partners: Canada, Cuba, 
People’s Republic of China, European 
Union, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, and United States.
In their annual Forum communi-
qué, leaders “noted with concern that 
there was limited regional cohesion by 
pfd partners due to varying levels of 
regional engagement, therefore making 
it difficult to identify where the Forum 
has formed clear issues-based coali-
tions with partners” (pifs 2015b). 
Leaders called for a strengthened 
annual pfd plenary that should focus 
on Island priorities, as well as seizing 
opportunities to talk in the margins of 
international meetings.
As European fishing nations such 
as Spain seek to extend operations in 
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the Pacific, the European Commis-
sion has been expanding high-level 
talks with regional organizations. EU 
Climate Commissioner Miguel Arias 
Cañete attended the 2015 Forum, fol-
lowing participation by EU Commis-
sion President José Manuel Barroso 
in 2011, EU Climate Commissioner 
Connie Hedegaard in 2011 and 2013, 
and High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign and Security Policy Baron-
ess Catherine Ashton in 2014. 
EU development assistance is 
largely channeled through the 11th 
European Development Fund (edf11), 
which globally allocates €30.5 billion 
in 2014–2020 (€1.00 is approxi-
mately us$1.13). As the ACP (African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific)–EU Joint Par-
liamentary Assembly convened in Suva 
in June, the European Union and pifs 
signed the edf11 Regional Indicative 
Program. Worth €166 million, this 
program will be allocated between the 
fifteen Pacific members of the ACP 
group.
EU trade with the Pacific has 
increased over the last five years, with 
nearly half of all Pacific exports in 
agriculture and 11.6 percent in fisher-
ies (however, this constitutes only 0.1 
percent of total EU trade). Despite reg-
ular EU expressions of trade support, 
European fisheries policy is adversely 
affecting the finalization of a compre-
hensive regional Economic Partnership 
Agreement (epa), first proposed in the 
2000 ACP-EU Cotonou Treaty. 
The regional epa treaty was due to 
be finalized in 2007, but there have 
been no formal negotiations between 
trade ministers since 2007 or any 
negotiations between officials since 
October 2013. The European Union is 
trying to pressure Pacific countries to 
join an interim epa agreement that Fiji 
and Papua New Guinea reluctantly 
adopted in 2009 to guarantee their 
sugar and fish exports to Europe. But 
this interim deal has little attraction 
for smaller island states, especially 
those without the capacity to establish 
fish canneries.
At the 2014 Forum in Palau, 
EU High Representative Catherine 
Ashton made a firm commitment that 
Europe would soon finalize the epa 
negotiations. Despite this pledge, in 
May 2015 the European Commission 
trade commissioner called for defer-
ment of further epa negotiations for 
three years, sparking outrage from 
many Pacific countries. pifs Secretary- 
General Taylor said: “For the Euro-
pean Commission to propose a defer-
ment of the negotiations without a 
formal political dialogue, particularly 
given its previous assurance to Pacific 
leaders in 2014, is unacceptable” (pifs 
2015a).
Much as Island governments 
complain about Canberra’s “boo-
merang aid,” Australia’s overseas aid 
program is a model of development 
effectiveness compared to the Euro-
pean Union’s notorious inflexibility 
and Japan’s rigid and unresponsive 
bureaucracy. Despite Japan’s signifi-
cant bilateral aid and long-term cul-
tural influence in the northern Pacific, 
Japanese prime ministers rarely visit 
Pacific Island countries—a sharp con-
trast to recent engagement by China, 
Indonesia, and India.
In May, Japan continued its series 
of Pacific leaders’ summits, known 
as palm, organized every three years 
since 1997. At the seventh palm 
Summit in Iwaki City, Prime Minis-
ter Shinzo Abe pledged ¥55 billion 
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(us$452 million) over the next three 
years for projects in disasters, climate, 
fisheries, trade, and tourism. 
For some, Tokyo’s high-level 
engagement with the region is becom-
ing a ritual. Fiji’s ambassador to 
Japan has criticized the palm process, 
stating: “The issues to be discussed are 
highly controlled by Japan. There is 
little real engagement with senior offi-
cials from the Pacific Island countries 
to work up the agenda for palm and 
to promote ownership amongst all the 
parties” (Mataitonga 2014).
The palm meeting reviewed the 
controversial Pacific Environment 
Community (pec) Fund, a us$66 
million initiative on solar  technology 
established at the 2009 summit. 
The pec program was managed 
through the Forum Secretariat, which 
is  supposed to be a policy body, 
although energy programs are more 
often implemented by the spc. The 
pec provided the same amount to each 
Island nation, even though Ambassa-
dor Mataitonga argued: “The one-
size-fits-all approach in the provision 
of development assistance needs to 
change to focus attention on country 
specific needs” (Mataitonga 2014).
Japan’s aid is subordinate to its 
fisheries and strategic policy in the 
Islands region. Japan and the United 
States are seeking support from 
Australia and New Zealand for their 
strategic competition with China in 
the western Pacific. After passage of 
controversial security laws by the Abe 
government, with significant sections 
of the population and a burgeon-
ing youth movement angered by the 
integration with US strategic policy, 
Tokyo is bidding to sell submarines to 
Australia in competition with France 
and Germany, as the Australian gov-
ernment prepares for the replacement 
of its Collins-class submarine force.
Beyond Japan, other Asian nations 
are seeking to counter rising Chinese 
influence in the region. In August, 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
hosted the second Forum for India–
Pacific Islands Cooperation in Jaipur. 
Modi made pledges on agriculture, 
food processing, fisheries, e-networks 
for telemedicine, solar energy, and 
climate change. He suggested that a 
Space Technology Applications Centre 
could be built in a Pacific country to 
support telemetry programs for India’s 
burgeoning space program. He also 
proposed health-care visits to the 
Islands by the Indian Navy, a good-
will effort already undertaken by the 
US, Australian, French, and Chinese 
armed forces (Times of India 2015). 
Korea is also trying to extend 
regional ties beyond its embassies in 
Papua New Guinea and Fiji, through 
annual regional meetings of senior 
officials and a triennial Korea-Pacific 
Foreign Ministers Meeting (first held 
in 2011). The October 2015 Korea-
Pacific officials meeting in Seoul 
promoted the country’s support on 
 climate change, with Korea hosting the 
new Green Climate Fund Secretariat. 
In 2015, Seoul doubled its funding to 
us$1 million annually for the Korea–
Pacific Islands Forum  Cooperation 
Fund, established in 2008.
China’s strategy in the region 
 continues to be debated by govern-
ments, academics, and think tanks. 
A major conference on China and 
the Pacific was held at the National 
 University of Samoa in February 
 (Powles 2016), while the Lowy Insti-
tute in Sydney developed an interactive 
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website to monitor Chinese-funded 
aid projects, especially as China over-
takes Australia as the major aid donor 
to Fiji.
Over three-quarters of Chinese 
aid to the region comes as conces-
sional loans, through a us$2 billion 
loan facility launched in 2013. Pacific 
leaders see China’s aid program as a 
supplement to existing aid partners, 
according to Samoan Prime Minister 
Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi: “Differ-
ent countries, development partners 
of the region, have different priorities, 
and that’s why I mention that China 
comes in as providing supplementary 
resources available to the region, 
covering those areas which are not 
covered in traditional aid donor 
 programs” (Blades 2015).
In 2015, the China Export Import 
(Exim) Bank agreed to fund us$195 
million for Papua New Guinea’s 
controversial Pacific Marine Indus-
trial Zone (pmiz) project, under 
construction by China’s Shenyang 
International Economic and Techni-
cal Cooperation Limited. The pmiz 
includes proposals for an export wharf 
and sewerage plant alongside ten fish-
processing plants, near Madang on 
Papua New Guinea’s north coast.
The number of Chinese tourists 
to Fiji grew from 4,000 (in 2009) to 
28,000 (in 2014), and in March 2015, 
officials announced that Chinese and 
Fijian nationals can travel to each 
other’s country without a visa.
In June, a series of trade and 
investment agreements worth us$331 
million were signed at the Fiji-China 
Economic and Trade Coopera-
tion Conference in Suva. Fiji Trade 
Minister Faiyaz Koya noted: “The 
 Bainimarama Government is fully 
committed to its policy of developing 
new markets and building new trade 
relationships. This is by engaging 
with its non-traditional development 
partners like China in order to create 
new trade and investment opportuni-
ties that benefit us all” (Fiji Sun 2015). 
The following month, Prime Minis-
ter Bainimarama met with Chinese 
 President Xi Jinping in Beijing.
Fiji’s growing links with Asia were 
evident when Thai Prime Minister 
General Prayut Chan-o-cha visited 
in September as the chief guest at the 
pidf summit. Fiji’s role in the UN 
Asia-Pacific group was highlighted 
when Peter Thomson, Fiji’s UN 
ambassador, was nominated as the 
group’s candidate for the presidency 
of the UN General Assembly in 2016. 
If successful, this would be the first 
time a Pacific Islands representative 
has led the General Assembly.
Fiji has also been strengthening 
links with Russia, as part of Suva’s 
post-coup diversification of diplomatic 
relations. Fiji Foreign Minister Ratu 
Inoke Kubuabola said: “The Russian 
Federation is especially important 
given the positive and invaluable sup-
port that Fiji received from them with 
regard to UN Peacekeeping Missions, 
in the face of strong objections from 
traditional partners” (Fiji Ministry of 
Information 2014).
Even though Fiji established 
 diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union 
in 1974, Japan-based diplomat Isikeli 
Mataitoga only presented his creden-
tials as Fijian ambassador to Russia 
in 2010. The February 2012 visit to 
Nadi by Sergei Lavrov was the first by 
a Russian foreign minister. Prime Min-
ister Bainimarama made a state visit 
to Moscow in July 2013, the first by a 
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Fijian leader, signing five cooperation 
agreements on defense, investment, 
and trade. 
In January 2016, Russia delivered 
a shipment of containers to Suva, 
reportedly including small arms, a 
helicopter, and other military equip-
ment. Acting Fiji Military Forces com-
mander Rear Admiral Viliame Nau-
poto stated that the equipment will 
rearm Fijian peacekeepers in place of 
“outdated weapons” (Doherty 2016). 
As media speculated on the 2016 arms 
shipment, a Russian Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson confirmed: “A batch of 
Russian small arms and munitions is 
being supplied to Fiji at the official 
request of that country. These weap-
ons will be used by Fiji’s mechanized 
infantry battalion which is part of 
the United Nations Disengagement 
Observer Force deployed in the Golan 
Heights” (tass 2016). 
In 2014, forty-five Fijian UN peace-
keepers were captured in the Golan 
Heights by the Islamist Al-Nusra 
Front, highlighting the need for bet-
ter protection at a time the Vladimir 
Putin regime has expanded military 
operations closer to the Israel-Syria 
border. Speculation that the Russian 
small arms are a sign of anti-Western 
alignment was somewhat undercut by 
the December delivery from Korea of 
anti-riot guns and teargas grenades 
(nfp 2016). The Fijian authorities will 
happily take military support from 
East and West!
Some Deep Water Fishing Nations 
(dwfns) have tried to undercut 
regional efforts for tuna manage-
ment. In response, Pacific diplomats 
have worked to ensure there was a 
specific goal on the oceans in the new 
global Sustainable Development Goals 
(sdgs). This was achieved when the 
new global objectives were adopted 
at a major UN summit in September, 
with sdg14 on the conservation and 
sustainable management of oceans and 
seas.
That month, Fiji Prime Minister 
Bainimarama told the UN General 
Assembly: “As a founding member of 
the UN’s Group of Friends of Oceans 
and Seas, Fiji has been working to 
establish a high-level global platform 
to ensure that we meet sdg14” (Baini-
marama 2015c). With support from 
Sweden, the United Nations will estab-
lish Triennial Conferences on Oceans 
and Seas, with five international 
conferences spanning the 2015–2030 
period of the Sustainable Development 
Agenda.
During 2015, there were a series 
of initiatives to advance the oceans 
agenda, extending the work of the 
Forum Fisheries Agency and the Par-
ties to the Nauru Agreement (pna)—
one of the success stories of Pacific 
regionalism.
In May, delegates gathered in Suva 
for the Pacific Ocean Alliance: High 
Hopes for High Seas meeting. The alli-
ance, launched at the 2014 Conference 
on Small Island Developing States, 
began operations with pifs’s Dame 
Meg Taylor as Pacific Ocean commis-
sioner. In a new spirit of cooperation 
with nongovernmental organizations, 
the Forum has obtained funding from 
Conservation International to sup-
port the Office of the Pacific Ocean 
Commissioner, housed in pifs. Other 
green multinationals are working with 
Pacific nations like Palau and Kiribati 
to create protected marine zones.
pna ministers from Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, 
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Kiribati, Nauru, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall 
Islands met in June in Pohnpei to 
coordinate management of the skip-
jack tuna fishery through the Vessel 
Day Scheme (vds).
In July, the eleventh ffa ministe-
rial meeting in Tuvalu endorsed a new 
Regional Roadmap for Sustainable 
Pacific Fisheries. The strategy aims to 
document stocks of the four key tuna 
species in the Pacific, combat Illegal, 
Unlicensed and Unregulated (iuu) 
fishing, and bring back bigeye tuna 
from its current depleted state.
In December, New Zealand’s 
Ambassador for Economic Develop-
ment Shane Jones angered pna mem-
bers by arguing for a quota-based 
payment system, even though the 
auctioning of vds permits has seen an 
increase in revenues to pna members 
from us$64 million (2010) to us$357 
million (2015). pna Chief Execu-
tive Officer Transform Aqorau said: 
“You have to really wonder whether 
there is value in (New Zealand) 
having a person running around the 
Pacific  rubbishing the (Vessel Day) 
scheme. . . . Instead of attacking the 
vds which is paying for teachers, 
nurses and doctors, they should be 
supporting us and the positive work 
we have done to make nations self-
reliant” (Rika 2015).
pna’s success comes as the United 
States has given notice of plans to 
withdraw from the South Pacific 
Tuna Treaty by 2017, ending its most 
important geopolitical arrangement 
with the Islands region. The end of the 
twenty-seven-year-old treaty comes 
after Washington agreed to pay us$89 
million for its 2016 fishing days and 
then reneged on the deal. The US deci-
sion means that purse seiners based in 
American Sāmoa risk being shut out 
of Pacific Island Exclusive Economic 
Zones.
Beyond the oceans, 2015 was 
the year of regional mobilization on 
climate change, as countries prepared 
for the December Conference of the 
Parties (cop21) of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in 
Paris.
The importance of climate action 
was brought home by disasters across 
the region, including Cyclone Pam in 
March. Pam affected 45 percent of 
Tuvalu’s population and also reached 
Fiji, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, and 
New Caledonia. Vanuatu was hardest 
hit—Pam’s 270 kilometer/hour winds 
destroyed critical infrastructure in Port 
Vila and rural centers, leaving tens of 
thousands of people without homes 
and damaging food gardens. Damage 
was estimated at us$450 million—64 
percent of the country’s gross domes-
tic product (adb 2015). 
A strong El Niño Southern Oscil-
lation in 2015–16 has also caused 
significant drought and frosts across 
Melanesia and eastern Australia, 
with negative impacts on agriculture, 
water supply, women’s labor, and 
village health. By year’s end, up to 
770,000 people in Papua New Guinea 
were  living in locations where food 
was very scarce or extremely scarce 
(Bourke, Allen, and Lowe 2016). 
Some villagers in Vanuatu became 
reliant on food aid because crops 
were growing slowly after being 
wiped out by Cyclone Pam, although 
the innovative nongovernmental 
organization program Yumi Stap 
Redi Long Klaemet Jenis had success-
fully prepared many villages through 
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 community resilience initiatives 
(Maclellan 2015e).
Climate policy caused tensions 
within the Pacific Islands Forum, as 
countries debated divergent priorities 
between Australia, New Zealand, and 
the Forum Island Countries. Ongoing 
tensions between pifs and pidf were 
highlighted by a series of declarations 
on climate change in the lead-up to the 
Paris negotiations.
In May, Prime Minister Bainima-
rama argued: “As we see it, Australia 
and New Zealand have been put to 
the test on climate change and been 
found wanting. So it should be no 
surprise that we have formed the view 
that at the very least, their position 
as full members of our island nation 
Forum needs to be questioned, re-
examined and redefined. They simply 
do not represent our interests as we 
face this critical matter of survival” 
(Bainimarama 2015a).
Ahead of cop21, Kiribati Presi-
dent Anote Tong wrote to world 
leaders asking them to back a global 
moratorium on new coal mines and 
mine expansions—a challenge to 
Australia, which plans new mines 
in Queensland’s Galilee basin. Tong 
rejected the excuse by Australian 
politicians that coal is necessary to lift 
people out of energy poverty: “I keep 
hearing this argument that it’s about 
the poor. Well, we are the poor and we 
will disappear. I don’t think it’s about 
the poor, it’s about the rich” (Pacnews 
2015).
In July, the Polynesian Leaders 
Group issued the Taputapuatea Dec-
laration on Climate Change, while in 
early September, the pidf issued the 
Suva Declaration on Climate Change, 
and the Smaller Island States delivered 
a tough statement as they caucused 
before the Forum. All called for the 
Paris Agreement to limit global aver-
age temperature increase to less than 
1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial 
levels, a stronger target than Australia 
and New Zealand have accepted. 
A week after the pidf summit, 
Forum leaders met in Port Moresby. 
With Australia and New Zealand in 
the room, the resulting Forum Decla-
ration on Climate Change was weaker 
than the pidf’s Suva Declaration. 
Media and community reaction forced 
the pifs to release a defensive state-
ment, stressing the positive elements of 
the Forum declaration (crop 2015).
In November, the Green Climate 
Fund (gcf) announced its first round 
of eight grants, including a us$31 
million water supply and waste project 
in Fiji. After the defeat of conserva-
tive Australian Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott by his more liberal colleague 
Malcolm Turnbull, Australia has 
rejoined the gcf board as co-chair.
In December, Pacific governments 
and nongovernmental organizations 
made strong interventions in the 
global climate talks in Paris. Mar-
shall Islands Foreign Minister Tony 
de Brum played a leading role in the 
“Higher Ambition” Coalition, which 
forged a broad alliance to strengthen 
commitments from industrialized 
nations.
The final Paris Agreement includes 
several crucial elements for the Pacific, 
including the aspirational goal limiting 
temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius 
above preindustrial levels, a strength-
ened mechanism for loss and damage, 
and the provision for scaled-up and 
simplified access to climate finance for 
small island developing states.
440 the contemporary pacific • 28:2 (2016)
Despite this, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (oecd) nations continue to pre-
varicate over commitments on climate 
financing, current emissions reduction 
targets still guarantee temperature 
increases of 2.7 to 3.4 degrees, and the 
Paris agreement includes an explicit 
clause stating that “Article 8 of the 
Agreement does not involve or provide 
a basis for any liability or compensa-
tion” (cop21 2015).
Beyond the campaign for climate 
justice, there were extensive public 
debates about human rights across 
the region. As the UN Human Rights 
Council conducted its Universal Peri-
odic Review (upr) of human rights in 
Kiribati, Minister for Women Tanga-
riki Reete said that climate change 
continues to be one of the country’s 
biggest threats to upholding human 
rights (Radio Australia 2015). 
During the year, the United 
Nations also conducted uprs for 
the  Federated States of Micronesia, 
Nauru, and Australia. For the  latter 
two  countries, the uprs revealed 
widespread  international concern over 
the offshore processing of asylum 
seekers, with a hundred countries 
formally raising issues with Australian 
 government policy. The UN Subcom-
mittee on the Prevention of Torture 
visited Nauru in February, calling for 
changes in the operation of Austra-
lia’s asylum-seeker detention center 
(unspt 2015). 
Other independent reviews into 
treatment of refugees on Nauru have 
revealed damning evidence about the 
prevalence of sexual and physical 
assault. A report on children in deten-
tion by the Australian Human Rights 
Commission found: “Children on 
Nauru are suffering from extreme lev-
els of physical, emotional, psychologi-
cal and developmental distress. The 
Commission finds that the inevitable 
and foreseeable consequence of Aus-
tralia’s transfer of children to Nauru is 
that they would be detained in breach 
of article 37(b) of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child” (ahrc 2015, 
200).
In the face of reports on assault, 
abuse, and rape in the centers, then 
Immigration Minister Scott Morrison 
falsely claimed in 2014 that staff from 
Save the Children working in Nauru 
were making false reports and coach-
ing detainees. Two reviews in 2015 
confirmed that there is no evidence to 
back up these claims, and the Austra-
lian government apologized and paid 
compensation to Save the Children 
(Moss 2015). 
Nauru Justice Minister David 
Adeang defended his country’s human 
rights record, even as critics chal-
lenged Nauru’s treatment of opposi-
tion members of Parliament (Farrell 
2015). Two opposition members were 
briefly jailed and mp Roland Kun 
was denied a passport to reunite with 
his family overseas. In response to 
international concern, New Zealand 
suspended its aid funding for Nauru’s 
judicial system.
In April, the UN Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues (unpfii) held a 
special half-day session on the Pacific 
Islands. Aboriginal legal scholar 
Professor Megan Davis of Australia 
served as chair of the 2015 Permanent 
Forum in New York, which recom-
mended that “the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees 
focus on the vulnerability of indig-
enous peoples in the Pacific region, 
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particularly in view of the effects of 
climate change” (unpfii 2015b).
In a statement, a caucus of Pacific 
groups from Guam, Papua New 
Guinea, Aotearoa/New Zealand, and 
Hawai‘i condemned the failure of the 
United Nations to develop “a concrete 
plan to implement the Right of Self 
Determination and delist the UN Non-
Self Governing Territories” (unpfii 
2015a).
Ever since the UN General Assem-
bly re-listed French Polynesia as a 
non-self-governing territory in May 
2013, France has stubbornly refused 
to acknowledge the authority of the 
United Nations over self-determina-
tion in French Polynesia. As required 
under Article 73e of the UN Charter, 
France submitted information to the 
United Nations about New Caledo-
nia in 2014 and 2015; however, Paris 
refused to formally submit informa-
tion on French Polynesia in either year 
(unga 2015, 3).
During 2015, msg leaders contin-
ued to publicly support independence 
leader Oscar Temaru’s call for talks 
on self-determination. Reaffirming 
the “inalienable right of the people 
of French Polynesia to self-determi-
nation,” Prime Minister Manasseh 
Sogavare told the UN General Assem-
bly on 1 October: “Solomon Islands 
calls on the administering power to 
fully cooperate with the work of the 
Special Committee. We note that 30 
years of nuclear testing by the admin-
istrative power caused widespread 
atomic radiation and has resulted in 
considerable health and environmental 
concerns” (Sogavare 2015).
Throughout the year, France and 
the governments of New Caledo-
nia and French Polynesia lobbied 
to upgrade their membership in the 
Pacific Islands Forum from associate 
to full membership. France’s Overseas 
Minister George Pau-Langevin lobbied 
at the 2015 Post-Forum Dialogue, 
while the French Polynesia govern-
ment raised the issue as President 
Édouard Fritch hosted the Polynesian 
Leaders Group summit in Tahiti.
In July, the Forum sent a special 
ministerial mission, led by PNG For-
eign Minister Rimbink Pato, to French 
Polynesia to assess the application. 
When Forum leaders considered the 
ministerial mission report, however, 
they once again deferred a decision. A 
key concern was whether the existing 
governance arrangements of French 
Polynesia would enable its government 
“to participate independently and 
effectively as a full member, in the full 
complement of political deliberation, 
decision making and commitments of 
the Forum” (pifs 2015b, item 23). 
This was a diplomatic reference to 
France’s ongoing control of the judi-
ciary, defense, and other key sectors 
(Corbin 2013).
France continued to lobby for the 
change at the November 2015 France-
Oceania summit in Paris. French 
President François Hollande stated: 
“I hope that the Pacific Islands Forum 
could welcome to its breast both New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia as full 
members, and Wallis and Futuna as an 
associate member. These three territo-
ries will be our representatives” (Les 
Nouvelles Calédoniennes 2015). The 
issue now returns to the Forum Sec-
retariat, which will conduct a review 
of the criteria for admission of new 
Forum members. This review will be 
submitted to the 2016 Forum Officials 
Committee for consideration, before it 
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is sent back to Pacific foreign ministers 
and leaders.
France’s regional relations are still 
affected by memories of past nuclear 
policies. On the thirtieth anniversary 
of the French terrorist attack against 
the Rainbow Warrior, and the sev-
entieth anniversary of the bombing 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Pacific 
governments spoke out on nuclear 
issues. At the Nuclear Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty review conference in 
May, Papua New Guinea joined other 
Pacific countries to call for more 
urgent action on nuclear disarmament 
(Maclellan 2015b).
As well as decolonization in ter-
ritories under the mandate of the UN 
Special Committee, there are other 
self-determination struggles in post-
colonial nations that are increasingly 
affecting regional relations, such as 
West Papua (Indonesia), Bougainville 
(Papua New Guinea), and Rapa Nui 
(Chile).
Chile’s colonial policy in Rapa Nui 
provides a strategic foothold in the 
eastern Pacific, at a time Chile is join-
ing other Pacific Rim countries in the 
Transpacific Partnership Agreement. 
Chilean and French forces conduct 
regular joint search-and-rescue maneu-
vers, while Chilean officials attended 
the South Pacific Defense Ministers’ 
Meeting in Port Moresby in April. 
Chilean military personnel regularly 
serve alongside US, Australian, and 
New Zealand naval forces in regional 
military exercises such as rimpac, 
Pacific Partnership, and unitas 
(Chandramohan 2015).
Bougainville poses a looming 
challenge for the Forum and the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group, with 
a proposed referendum on self-deter-
mination to be held over the next five 
years. Port Moresby is sensitive about 
external interference in Bougainville, 
highlighted by PNG government 
anger over Australia’s announcement 
of plans to expand diplomatic repre-
sentation in Buka. Despite this, the 
Pacific Islands Forum deployed an 
elections monitoring team in May to 
observe elections for the Autonomous 
Bougainville Government (abg), led 
by Fiji and Vanuatu officials. President 
John Momis was returned to office 
over eight other candidates.
Momis has argued that indepen-
dence for Bougainville can only be 
secured by reinvigorating extractive 
industries, including the Panguna 
gold and copper mine. In March, the 
abg enacted the Bougainville Min-
ing Act 2015, transforming rights 
for Bougainville Copper Ltd (bcl), 
the Rio Tinto subsidiary that ran the 
Panguna mine until the conflict of the 
1990s. Since passage of the Mining 
Act, there has been widespread debate 
about customary landowner rights, 
especially following media reports that 
the PNG government might purchase 
bcl’s Panguna stake (Jubilee Australia 
2015).
The regional debate over West 
Papua made significant advances in 
2015 (Maclellan 2015a). The Face-
book generation across Melanesia is 
ramping up the pressure and Pacific 
governments are starting to take 
notice: the issue was included in the 
agenda of both the msg summit in 
Honiara and the Forum leaders meet-
ing in Port Moresby.
In December 2014, Vanuatu 
churches and customary chiefs, sup-
ported by the government, hosted 
a meeting to form a united front 
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between three strands of the West 
Papuan nationalist movement, uniting 
Jayapura-based activists and exiled 
campaigners. In February 2015, the 
newly created United Liberation 
Movement for West Papua (ulmwp) 
submitted an application for full msg 
membership.
Indonesia worked to blunt the 
diplomatic advances of the West 
Papuan nationalist movement. In 
March, Indonesian Foreign Minister 
Retno Marsudi traveled to Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Fiji. In 
May—a month before the msg sum-
mit—President Joko Widodo visited 
West Papua and Papua New Guinea, 
announcing clemency for five political 
prisoners and other concessions.
With Papua New Guinea maintain-
ing close ties to its Asian neighbor, 
Fiji has also improved ties to Jakarta, 
symbolized by former Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
opening the 2014 pidf summit and 
Indonesia’s role in co-chairing the 
Multinational Observer Group for 
Fiji’s elections. At the msg summit, 
Prime Minister Bainimarama stated: 
“Indonesian sovereignty over West 
Papua cannot be questioned. . . . the 
msg has no choice but to deal with 
Indonesia in a positive and con-
structive manner. The best hope for 
improving the lives of the people of 
West Papua is to work closely with 
the Indonesian government, one of 
the most vibrant democracies in the 
world” (Bainimarama 2015b).
In contrast to Fiji and Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands under Prime 
Minister Sogavare has expanded 
diplomatic support for the West Papua 
nationalist movement. This comple-
ments long-standing solidarity from 
Vanuatu and New Caledonia’s Front 
de Libération Nationale Kanak et 
Socialiste (flnks). On the eve of the 
msg summit, outgoing msg Chair 
Victor Tutugoro of the flnks publicly 
expressed reservations about Indone-
sia expanding its role in the msg: “For 
the flnks, the msg is an organisation 
of Melanesian countries. As I see it, 
Indonesia is not part of the Melane-
sian bloc” (Maclellan 2015a).
The divergent views among Mela-
nesian leaders were brought to a head 
at the Honiara summit in a historic 
decision to expand the msg’s reach. 
An uneasy consensus led to the grant-
ing of associate member status to 
Indonesia and observer status to the 
ulmwp. To dodge questions over 
Indonesian sovereignty, the msg lead-
ers agreed that “the ulmwp be admit-
ted as an observer under the regional 
and international category repre-
senting Melanesians living abroad,” 
despite the ulmwp representing 
groups both inside and exiled from 
West Papua (msg 2015, 6). 
In the presence of a large Indone-
sian delegation—but not the governors 
of Papua and West Papua provinces—
the Island leaders approved “that 
associate membership be accorded to 
Indonesia representing the five Mela-
nesian provinces in Indonesia” (Papua, 
West Papua, Maluku, North Maluku, 
and East Nusa Tenggara). The future 
role of the five governors is unclear, 
given the historic difference between 
Papua and West Papua (which 
remained under Dutch administration 
until the 1960s) and the other three 
provinces (which were part of Indone-
sia from independence in 1949).
The issue of West Papua has not 
been considered by the Pacific Islands 
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Forum since 2006, but it was one of 
five core topics proposed to Forum 
leaders through the Framework on 
Pacific Regionalism. At the Forum, 
leaders recognized Indonesia’s sover-
eignty over the Papuan provinces but 
“called on all parties to protect and 
uphold the human rights of all resi-
dents in Papua and to work to address 
the root causes of such conflicts by 
peaceful means” (pifs 2015b). Forum 
Chair Peter O’Neill was tasked with 
consulting with Indonesia on a pos-
sible fact-finding mission to discuss 
the situation in West Papua. 
The message about dialogue hasn’t 
gotten through to Indonesia’s hard-
line defense minister, Ryamizard 
Ryacudu, with the former army chief 
of staff stating that West Papua should 
not be an issue for regional discussion: 
“There are countries that are getting 
involved in the issue of Papua. For 
us, Papua is in the United Republic of 
Indonesia. There is no other solution 
to talk about it, that’s it, that’s the 
way it is. So this is so that everyone 
will know that that doesn’t need to be 
spoken about” (Nicholson 2015).
Beyond debates over self-determi-
nation, the rights of women in Papua 
New Guinea and other Island nations 
raised international comment, with 
extensive reporting of violence against 
women and children. A Human Rights 
Watch report on family violence in 
Papua New Guinea called on the PNG 
government to expedite the implemen-
tation of the 2013 Family Protection 
Act (hrw 2015). 
Following publication of govern-
ment documents by Edward Snowden, 
Wikileaks, and other whistle-blowers, 
there is renewed evidence of intel-
ligence surveillance in the Pacific 
Islands by the so-called “five eyes 
alliance”: the US National Security 
Agency (nsa), the Australian Signals 
Directorate (asd), the NZ Govern-
ment Communications Security 
Bureau (gcsb), the Communications 
Security Establishment Canada (csec), 
and the UK Government Communica-
tions Headquarters (gchq).
Documents released in 2015 show 
that New Zealand’s electronic surveil-
lance agency gcsb is targeting most 
Pacific Island neighbors (Hager and 
Gallagher 2015c). Since 2009, the 
gcsb intelligence base at Waihopai 
has moved to “full-take collection,” 
indiscriminately intercepting Asia-
Pacific communications and providing 
them en masse to the nsa through 
the controversial intelligence system 
XKeyscore, which is used to monitor 
e-mails and Internet browsing habits.
According to other documents, the 
asd has also been targeting telecom-
munications in Indonesia and the 
Pacific Islands. The Age newspaper 
reported that “asd and gcsb person-
nel intercepted mobile phone calls 
from a signals intelligence collection 
facility near Honiara, codenamed 
caprica and probably located at 
Camp ramsi, the headquarters of 
the Regional Assistance Mission to 
the Solomon Islands. With a view 
to expanding coverage of Solomon 
Telekom’s network, the asd and gcsb 
also conducted a radio frequency 
survey, codenamed preboil, at the 
Australian Federal Police facility at the 
Guadalcanal Beach Resort near Hen-
derson Airport” (Dorling 2015).
According to another nsa docu-
ment, New Zealand’s gcsb also tar-
geted government officials in Solomon 
Islands during 2013. These included 
political reviews • region in review 445
the permanent secretary of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, the prime 
minister’s chief of staff and permanent 
 secretary, a senior foreign affairs offi-
cial, and even a leading anti-corrup-
tion campaigner, Benjamin Afuga of 
Forum Solomon Islands International 
(Hager and Gallagher 2015a, 2015b). 
nic maclellan
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